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Policy Contradictions o f the Australian Task Force, Vietnam, 1966 
Terry Burstall
Introduction
The dispatch o f a two battalion Task Force to Phuoc Tuy Province 
South V ietnam  in 1966 was a progression from  the 1962 com m itm ent 
to South V ietnam  o f a small team o f m ilitary advisers. A s the internal 
m ilitary and political situation o f the Governm ent o f South V ietnam  
deteriorated from  1960, so United States m ilitary support increased. As 
Am erican support grew  it became increasingly important for other 
countries to be seen to be in agreem ent with United States actions and 
ob je c tiv e s  in  V ie tn a m  not on ly  v e rb a lly  b u t a lso  p h ys ica lly . 
Correspondingly the size o f the small team  o f Australian advisers was 
increased to 83 by the end o f 1964, and in April 1965 Australia 
responded w illingly to United States requests for more support by 
announcing the com mitment o f a com bat battalion to South Vietnam . In 
1966, in line with further United States troop level increases, the 
Australian force was increased to a self contained two battalion Task 
Force to be based in Phuoc Tuy Province, 60 m ile east o f Saigon.
Although the Australian Governm ent supported the United 
States’ actions in Vietnam, it was apparent from 1962 that active 
support would be curtailed by dom estic political and organizational 
realities in Australia. Political reality lay in the fact that the involvem ent 
was not based upon a bi-partisan decision o f the Australian Parliament, 
and that it did not depend on tested electoral support from  Australian 
voters.1 The organizational reality was the size and quality o f the forces 
that could be sent to Vietnam. As the Australian Arm y in 1965 only 
consisted o f four battalions it required a m ajor re-organization and up­
grading to prepare for a commitment to Vietnam. By necessity the 
Australian force had to remain extrem ely small in relation to the rapidly 
increasing United States effort.
The disparity o f size o f the two countries’ com m itm ents m eant 
that i f  Australian forces remained closely tied to United States forces 
they could only be m inor players in a much larger effort and would of 
necessity have to be under direct United S lates command. To achieve 
some autonom y o f command it was therefore considered desirable in 
1966 to m ove the Task  Force to an area where it could establish an 
Australian national presence. The Australian command could then 
make its own policy decisions, m aintain its own unit integrity and apply 
its own tactics while still being incorporated, and able to work within, 
overall United States command.
36 Terry B urjtaU
This article will examine two policy decisions made by the 
Australian Task Force in 1966 which locked it into postures that were 
impossible to move away from in the following years of the involvement. 
The two areas to be examined are: the policies toward sections o f the 
civilian population of the province; and the creation of a large defended 
base camp. This article will argue that these decisions seriously affected: 
1) Australian and United States capacity to win the population to the side 
of the Government of Vietnam; and 2) the capacity of the Australians to 
work within United States operational concepts and strategies.
Background
Australian involvement in Vietnam was primarily an attempt to 
secure an insurance policy with the United States of America should 
Australian interests be challenged in southeast Asia. The surge of 
nationalism sweeping the world during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
impending withdrawal of British troops from “East of Suez” and the 
perceived spectre of a communist and antagonistic Indonesia aligned 
with China, meant the Australian Government willingly embraced the 
policies of the United States in southeast Asia as a means of securing 
military aid in its own time of need.
As the United States involvement in Vietnam increased from 
1960, Australia responded to requests for visible moral support. In 1962 
a small Army Training Team component of 30 men flew to Vietnam and 
was placed under United States command, officially to be used in a 
training role only. By 1964. in response to United States pressure, this 
component was increased to 83 and their role had been expanded to 
include participation in combat situations.
Due to the run down of the Australian Army at that time and the 
extra pressures placed on Australia’s expanding training base because 
of the introduction of National Service (the draft), it was impossible to 
increase the numbers o f Training Team personnel to meet United Stales 
demands. The decision was made therefore in December 1964 to offer 
instead a battalion of combat troops. At the time, this offer was 
inappropriate because the United States had no combat units in 
Vietnam and a battalion could not have been incorporated into their 
military structure. However, with the landing of the Marines at Da Nang 
in March 1965, and the subsequent arrival of other United States units, 
the Australian offer o f a battalion became a viable proposition.
The First Battalion
The First Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was sent to 
Vietnam in May/June 1965 and became part of the United States 173rd 
Airborne Brigade based at Bien Hoa airbase. However, placing the 
battalion with the 173rd created problems for both the United States and 
Australian commanders in Vietnam. The concept and role o f the 
battalion laid down by the Australian Army and the Government in
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Canberra was restricted originally to securing m ilitary installations and 
supporting South Vietnamese or United States forces under attack. This 
role was not flexible enough for General Westmoreland (Commander, 
United States M ilitary Assistance Command Vietnam). D ifficulties arose 
in July when the Australian battalion was prohibited from participating 
in a 173rd Brigade operation by the Australian Chief o f Staff.2 The role 
o f the force was later expanded and by the end o f 1965 the Australians 
were perm itted to engage in offensive operations in the whole o f III (Three) 
Corps area.
Tension still remained, however, as the Australians were not 
impressed with the United States style o f combat operations, neither 
with respect to their methods o f continuous resupply nor with the 
apparent disregard by United States officers o f their own level o f 
casualties. By the end o f 1965 it was apparent that the circum stances 
facing the First Battalion were not the best possible for the Australian 
forces, not only from  the Austra lian  perspective but also from  
W estm oreland’s.
W estm oreland used the 173rd Brigade as his mobile reserve, 
which meant that they had to be able to move to any part o f South 
Vietnam as required. In June 1966 he was considering sending the 
173rd to Darlac Province in 11 (Two) Corps on the Cambodian border, and 
recorded: “These troops will be m oving constantly and their operations 
will be in support o f ARVN [Army o f the Republic o f Vietnam], RF/PF 
[Regional Force and Popular Force] and CIDG [Civil Irregular Defence 
Group] units."3 To be left short o f a battalion because o f Australian 
refusal to allow their forces to move to a certain area was unacceptable 
to the United States. That there were also tensions arising from the 
Australian perspective was made clear when the Australian Arm y 
Department Secretary was reported to have said: “We found ourselves in 
Bien Hoa with the United States forces on one side and the Vietnam ese 
on the other and we quickly decided that the best place to be was 
somewhere else.”4
By March 1966 it had been decided that Australia would increase 
the size o f its commitment and send to Vietnam  a self-contained Task 
Force o f two battalions to replace the First Battalion which was due to 
return home in June 1966. This was a calculated gamble because a two 
battalion Task F orce was not a balanced force according to contemporary 
m ilitary doctrine, which held that a Task Force should be at least three 
battalions, giving it the ability to have two battalions in the field and one 
operating as base defence. Having only two battalions meant that o f the 
4500 Australian troops in Vietnam at any one time, less than ha lf were 
combat troops— infantry and supporting arms— and operations would 
be limited to one battalion strength.
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Planning the move to Phuoc Tuy
Lieutenant General John Wilton, the Chief of the General Staff, 
and a party o f service personnel flew from Australia to Saigon for 
discussions with General Westmoreland on the role and placement of the 
Task Force in March 1966. Discussions on the placement had already 
taken place between General Westmoreland and the Commander of 
Australian Army Force Vietnam (COMAAFV), Brigadier O.D. Jackson, 
and agreem ent was reached on Phuoc Tuy Province.5 Jackson 
commented that, “we were to be used somewhere where we could do the 
job and it would suit our ability. This area of the north [Demilitarized 
Zone] was to be left as I understood it to the the Americans and the 
Vietnamese.”6 He went on to say:
They [the United States] had some difficulty with foreign troops 
and they weren't too sure how things would work out. I think 
Westmoreland was happy to have us in a place where we could 
do things our way and not be exposed in the early days to heavy 
casualties, which was made pretty clear to me [from Australia] 
just wasn't on.7
General Wilton had already decided tentatively upon Phuoc Tuy 
before he arrived in Vietnam in March 1966, mainly because of the deep 
water port at Vung Tau and the fact that the Australian force would be 
well away from the northern demilitarized zone.8 Westmoreland was by 
then in agreement with the move to Phuoc Tuy and wanted the 
Australians to work in the eastern portion of the Rung Sat and provide 
protection for Highway 15, running from the port of Vung Tau to Saigon. 
The Australian force was tobe part of the US II (Two) Field Force Vietnam 
which was headquartered at Long Binh in the adjoining Bien Hoa 
Province, and whose responsibility was the whole of the Vietnamese III 
(Three) Corps.9
Preparing for the Australian Arrival
In April 1966 Westmoreland sent elements of the 1st Infantry 
Division, accompanied by the Australian First Battalion, into Phuoc Tuy 
on Operation ABILENE. It was not a resounding success as only light 
contacts were made for most of the operation. The main force units of the 
Viet Cong (VC) 9 and 5 Divisions were out of the province when the 
operation was launched and only started moving back as it finished. The 
only major action of the operation was the attack on a United States unit 
on the night o f 11-12 April. The VC 800 Battalion of the 274 Regiment 
launched three attacks on a United States position in an attempt to over­
run the perimeter, but were repulsed each time with the help of heavy 
artillery barrages that pounded 1086 rounds into the area during the 
night. The casualty figures are indicative of the overall tempo of 
ABILENE. During the 16 day operation United Slates casualties were 39 
killed, 97 wounded, none missing. The action during the night of 11-12
Policy  Contradictions o f the Australian Task Force 39
April resulted in 34 killed and 72 wounded, leaving casualties for the rest 
o f the force and the operation at five killed and 25 wounded. VC 
casualties for the operation were 67 KLA and five captured.10
In May Westmoreland sent the 173rd to PhuocTuy on Operation 
HARDIHOOD to clear the area prior to the Australian arrival. When the 
Australian Fifth Battalion arrived in the area the 173rd then went south 
on Operation HOLLANDLA, into the paddy area of Long My, and carried 
out their first night airborne landing. HOLLANDLA was not a good 
operation for the 173rd, for although they encountered ve iy  little 
opposition their casualties were relatively high: nine killed and 68 
wounded, mainly from booby traps, against fourVC killed, by body count, 
four possible and four captured.11 Summing up, the “Commander’s 
Analysis” noted: “It is unlikely that the VC elements in the area 
constitute a single force of greater than company strength”.12
The Australians at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province
By 14 June 1966 the Fifth and Sixth Battalions of the Royal 
Australian Regiment, plus supporting units and Task Force Headquarters, 
had arrived at the Nui Dat base. The base was to cover a large area o f over 
two square kilometres of mainly rubber plantation and included the 
small hill, Nui Dat. Highway 2 on the western edge of the base was closed 
to the local people except at designated periods. The layout of the area 
created many defensive problems, chiefly because of the large unmanned 
gap along the western side. Brigadier Jackson, the new Task Force 
commander, thought he could fill this gap with a third battalion, but it 
was to be another 18 months before a third battalion arrived. Jackson’s 
rationale for taking such a large area was that it provided the units with 
room to fight should the base ever be attacked. Although it gave room to 
fight, the large area created enormous problems from its inception 
because of the number of troops required to secure the perimeter, 
effectively cutting down on operational capability.
With the perimeters established the Task Force was then faced 
with the formidable job of trying to build the area into a defensive 
position, as well as attempting to mount operations. One of the key 
elements of the Australian strategy was to create a buffer zone or “cordon 
sanitaire" around the base out to 4000 metres (just over two-and-a-half 
miles) , except for the southern end where the large village of Hoa Long 
was located at a distance of less than 1000 metres (about two-thirds of 
a mile) from the perimeter. This buffer zone was to be kept clear of 
civilians and to be dominated by saturation patrolling, hoping thereby 
to deny enemy forces intelligence and forming-up areas from which to 
launch an attack on the base. The rubber plantation was kept intact with 
a minimum of clearing, and no lights were allowed at night. The open 
area on the western side was covered by fire from both the high ground 
of Nui Dat and the armoured personnel carriers (APCs) area which 
straddled both sides o f the road on the southern section. Artillery was
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situated at the southern entrance and could bring fire to bear on most 
of the perimeter. The base was declared off limits to all civilians in the 
area. Local leave close to the base was prohibited; any leave was to be 
taken in the port city o f VungTau, 30 kilometres (18 miles) to the south, 
where a large Australian logistic base was set up and from which 
supplies for Nui Dat were transported by road, with a contingency plan 
for aerial resupply if required.
From the m ilitary perspective the plan was quite sound. 
Unfortunately in the Vietnamese context it was full o f contradictions, 
and placed the Australian force not only in conflict with the local 
population but also with General Westmoreland.
The Australians and the Local People
Contrary to what the Australian military historian and then 
Intelligence O fficer with 5RAR, Robert O ’Neill, has written, the 
positioning o f the Australian base did not take into consideration the 
needs of the local population.13 There was considerable dislocation of 
both the economic and social structure of the province because o f the 
establishment of the base, which in turn created considerable animosity 
toward the Australians from the beginning.
The United States and Australian forces’ major problem during 
their Vietnam intervention was the calibre o f the government they were 
there to assist. Australian Army publications had made the point in a 
study o f counter-revolutionary warfare that the first requirement for 
success was a competent civilian government.14 It would be impossible, 
under any criteria, to call the governments o f South Vietnam since 1954 
competent, especially that of m id-1966 when the “Struggle Movement” 
had President Ky more concerned with fighting his own generals than the 
VC. Because the central government was largely corrupt and incompetent, 
the governmental support required to consolidate military actions was 
not in place. Therefore the policies of creating clear areas and resettling 
population that worked for Robert Thompson in Malaya, where the 
British were the government and the army, had no validity in Vietnam. 
Thompson’s methods o f clear areas and resettlement were not viable 
options for the Australian and United States forces in Vietnam, as 
neither the governmental backup required for relief of hardship following 
resettlement, nor the political will to show that the military policies had 
some legitimate rationale existed.
When the Australians arrived in Phuoc Tuy they established the 
base camp at Nui Dat adjacent to a densely populated area. To achieve 
the aim o f the 4000 metre buffer zone required the movement of 8000 
people, almost ten per cent of the province population. Inside the 4000 
metre buffer zone (excluding Hoa Long) were two villages. Long Phuoc 
and Long Tan, with a population together of approximately 4000 people. 
In addition to this there were the many people living on small plots of land 
inside the area. All o f these small landholders were forcibly moved from
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their homes and told to relocate in the nearby towns. This movement of 
the population has been described by all m ilitary writers o f the period so 
far as a “resettlement” , a highly ambiguous usage since it implies that 
the people were helped. This was not the case in Phuoc Tuy in 1966.
The village of Hoa Long, although inside the 4000 metre area, was 
allowed to remain, but the villages o f LongTan (approximately 1000 people) 
and Long Phuoc (approximately 3000 people) were evacuated and 
subsequently destroyed. The people from Long Tan had been forced from 
their village by ARVN forces, assisted by United States troops, during 
ABILENE in April, and the people of Long Phuoc by the 173rd Brigade in 
May. The people of LongTan were forced into the towns o f Dat Do and Long 
Dien, while those from Long Phuoc were moved to Hoa Long, Long Dien, and 
some to Dat Do. This relocation, it was presumed, made the task of 
population control easier since the people were concentrated in villages 
under some semblance of ARVN control. Once moved these people were 
then forgotten by the Australian forces and received no help in the re­
establishment of their homes or modes of life.15
It would be naive to suggest that these people were not an 
Australian responsibility on the grounds that it was not the Australians 
who actually forced them from their areas. The plan for the Australian 
base was well in place before ABILENE and the displacement of the 
population o f LongTan. When the United States forces left, the people 
tried to return to their homes but were forbidden by the implementation 
o f Australian policy. Their village was then destroyed by a combination 
of artillery and neglect. With their only source o f income denied them 
they became beggars, exploited labour, or at best poor relations for those 
lucky enough to have relatives in Dat Do or Long Dien. The inhabitants 
o f Long Phuoc received worse treatment. Where the Long Tan villagers 
had time to take many o f their possessions, the Long Phuoc villagers had 
been shifted from their village during the 173rd Brigade’s operation in 
May 1966, but only so that the brigade could operate through the village. 
They were not evacuated to become refugees. The 173rd “After Action” 
report from HARDIHOOD states: “Refugees 0”. When the Australians 
continued HARDIHOOD they first closed the area and then in late June 
proceeded to destroy the village. This was a house-by-house destruction 
of substantial structures made of brick, dressed timber and tiles. 
Australian records state that 537 dwellings were destroyed. Dwellings 
were physically pulled down and all the villagers’ possessions burnt. 
These included cooking and eating utensils, bedding, clothing, school 
books, photographs, family ornaments and farming implements. The 
fields, fruit trees and gardens were defoliated, remaining off-lim its until 
September when the people were allowed back to work their ground for 
only two days a week under strict curfew conditions. There is no record 
o f how these people survived the initial move, but the Task Force Civil 
Affairs officer states that he knew that some of the people from Long 
Phuoc went into Hoa Long, and that: “There was no work for them and
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they were just hanging around Hoa Long. They weren’t starving but they 
were pretty bloody hungiy and they were dirt poor . . .  I cried tears for 
them, believe you m e.”16
As the Task Force was short o f infantry, drastic measures were 
initiated in order to keep the civilians away from the closed areas. One 
of these measures was the deliberate firing o f artillery onto local people 
who were seen going into the areas. Messages from the Task Force signal 
log (Table 1) show that there was a disregard for the safety of the civilian 
population in order to enforce policy. Although the messages cited below 
are for September 1966, there are many similar instances throughout 
the records for 1966 and 1967.
It would be possible to excuse this policy if there had been no 
need for the people to go back to their old areas, but the people had no 
option; they had to return in order to survive because no help was given 
to them. If cattle strayed they would naturally have gone back to their old 
areas. Therefore the people had to retrieve them. If they did, they ran the
Table 1 17
Serial | Date | Time | From | Messaqe
48 12 0730 AVN Two buildings under 
construction in Long Tan 
488659.489657. Arty 
[artillery] to fire some rounds.
111 13 1105 ALO 3 people at Long Phuoc 
heading north on trail 50 
metres from road. They are 
carrying baskets on poles. 
G[round] Reference] 452651. 
Arty engaged. Smoke 
followed by H[igh]E[xplosive].
113 13 1120 AI JO 3 cattle 461659 North of 
road, west of river between 
Long Tan and Long Phuoc. 
470654 people (2) working 
fields. Engaged by artillery.
114 13 1132 ALO Herd of cattle at 465653. 
Engaged by artillery.
789 25 1242 ALO Numerous people in Long 
Phuoc on main road travelling 
both east and west. Engaged 
by artillery.
923 28 1209 ALO People walking east into Long 
Phuoc YS 438639. 15 cattle 
and one man at 469654. 8 
people/cattle south of Long 
Tan 485652 moving north. 
Remarks. Arty engaged.
[ALO stands for Air Liaison Officer, which was the small army spotter plane that 
flew over the area reporting movements.]
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risk o f being killed; if they did not then it was almost certain that their 
cattle would be killed, and their last remaining possessions lost.
Although the forced relocation o f civilians and the creation of 
“free fire” zones became an accepted procedure for all Free World Forces 
in Vietnam, it was in direct contravention of policies laid down by the 
Australian Army in 1965. The Division In Battle pamphlet states:
The principles of humanity prohibit the use of any degree of 
violence not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War 
is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles.
To a large extent these principles have been given concrete form 
in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not 
become legal rules, a military commander should consider 
whether a proposed course of action would be inhumane even 
though not prohibited by international law.18
“Principles of humanity" were ignored with respect to the 8000 people 
who had once resided and earned their living in the area taken over by 
the Australians, and a “degree of violence not actually necessary for the 
purpose o f the war” , was inflicted on them. The relocation and the 
subsequent abandonment of responsibility for the 8000 people alTected 
by the positioning of the Task Force, in addition to the policy o f dumping 
VC bodies in town market squares or dragging them behind APCs in sight 
of the village children, both methods supposedly meant to draw out 
further VC sympathisers, did nothing to help the Australian, United 
States or South Vietnamese cause in Phuoc Tuy. Attempts at civic 
action, such as building school rooms, a Boy Scout hall, or a new market, 
none of which the people wanted, were not enough to overcome the 
animosity caused by the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Further, 
with the implementation of later policies o f arresting ARVN draft 
dodgers, the continual “cordon-and-search” of villages, the arrest and 
handing over to South Vietnamese authorities ofVC “suspects” , who were 
then badly treated and confined sometimes for months, it is easy to 
understand why Hoa Long, situated less than 1000 metres from the front 
gate o f the Australian base, was never considered pacified. Hoa Long 
remained a village of women, children and old men and offered resistance 
for the whole period of the Australian presence. In 1971, five years after 
the Australians moved to Phuoc Tuy in May 1966, it was recorded that 
in Hoa Long:
Security is only a little better [than 1966) and far from satisfactory, 
due to the still predominant anti-GVN [Government of Vietnam) 
feeling . . . Agent reports from Hoa long indicate that there is 
some form of VC activity inside the hamlet every night.19
The policies adopted by the Australians in 1966 alienated them 
from the very people from whom they needed support if the war was ever 
to be brought to the conclusion which the United States and Australia
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desired. The VC could not survive without the help of the people, and yet 
through their first actions in Phuoc Tuy the Australian Task Force had 
alienated almost ten per cent of the population. It is certain that those 
who may have been neutral before the Australians arrived did not remain 
so after the treatment alTorded them.
Australian Military Policies
According to Brigadier Jackson, the first Task Force commander, 
Westmoreland’s orders to him were to, “take over Phuoc Tuy. Those were 
the only tactical orders I had from anyone.”20 From the evidence available 
it would seem that the General Westmoreland’s idea of “take over Phuoc 
Tuy” was very different from Brigadier Jackson’s. The latter's plan was 
to move into the area of Nui Dat, establish a large fortified camp adjacent 
to the main population centres and show the local population and the VC 
that the Australians were there to stay. The original intention was to 
establish the base and slowly expand the area of control, disrupting VC 
bases and lines o f communications and eventually cutting off the VC 
from the population in short “pacification".
The problem with this concept was that it was not United States 
policy at that time. It is not an aim o f this article to attempt to analyze 
which policy would have been the more appropriate or successful in 
relation to the Vietnam conflict. Rather, since the Australians were part 
o f an American Field Force the wishes of the senior American commander 
in the theatre would have to have been taken into account. General 
Westmoreland’s policy in 1966 was for United Stales and Free World 
Forces to be “manoeuvre battalions” , which were to engage and kill 
enemy “main force” units while the ARVN together with United States 
advisors carried out the pacification and nation-building roles. He did 
not envisage that Free World Forces would be involved in pacification: 
“COMUSMACVs [General Westmoreland] instructions to his commanders 
were to ‘undertake operations which will find, fix and destroy Viet Cong 
(VC) forces by sustained and aggressive actions'.”21
This difference in interpretation of role is apparent when one 
considers, first, that the Australians established their base adjacent to 
the populated centres, but had no authority in those areas, since they 
were the responsibility of the Vietnamese province chief and his United 
Slates advisers, and second, that Australian forces could not mount 
operations which penetrated the populated areas without the permission 
of the province chief.
Whatever Westmoreland’s interpretation of the role, it is doubtful 
that the Australian Government would have been prepared to accept the 
political costs which a more offensive strategy and possibly higher 
casualties would have entailed. Consideration must also be given to the 
operational reality that the Australians did not have the capacity to work 
to Westmoreland’s concept because of the lack of both front line troops 
and available equipment. Because the perimeter of the base covered 
such a large area, a full battalion was required to man it, but even this
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was not really adequate at that time because there was little barbed wire 
available and no weapon pits had been dug. Spare parts tor APCs and 
personal weapons for troops were at a minimum, and when some patrols 
went out there were not enough machine guns remaining within the 
perimeter for adequate base defence. In addition relations between the 
Royal Australian Air Force and the Army were strained and command 
problems took several months to be resolved, all o f which added to base 
defence inadequacies.
Rather than being used to mount extensive offensive operations 
against main force VC units, the first four months of the Australian 
force’s time were taken up by a continual battle against the elements 
during the wet season, a battle aggravated by supply shortages and 
inter-service rivalries. Despite this, the patrols and close operations were 
almost continuous with one battalion out while the other manned the 
base. The battalion manning the base was not confined to a static role 
but had fighting patrols and ambushes constantly on the move. The 
building of the base progressed virtually by hand labour, meaning that 
troops received no rest between operations. Brigadier Jackson, the Task 
Force Commander, wrote in August that “the pace of operations is 
beginning to tell and there are indications that the infantry are becoming 
very fatigued both physically and mentally . .. Recreational facilities are 
inadequate".22
The continual patrolling, the “cordon-and-search” of villages, 
and the operations into suspected enemy base areas continued for the 
rest o f the year. However, this was only local activity, as the Australians 
went no further than 30 kilometres (18 miles) from the base. Although 
VC base areas and lines of communications were disrupted, only small 
groups of enemy were encountered, except for two clashes that were 
enemy initiated. During December the Task Force was called upon by II 
Field Force Vietnam to participate in Operation DUCK as security for 
part o f Highway 15, while the 9th Infantiy Division moved from the port 
of VungTau to Long Thanh (Bear Cat). In view of the fact that the security 
of Highway 15 was one o f the specific roles Westmoreland had envisaged 
for the Australians it seems strange that Brigadier Jackson should 
describe operations to secure it as “flashes in the pan”.23 He recorded 
later that “our ability to conduct offensive operations against the VC in 
December was severely limited by road security operations.”2'1
There were only two major actions involving the Australian force 
during 1966, and both were enemy initiated. The first was in July during 
Operation HOBART, when the Australian Sixth Battalion encountered 
elements o f the local force D445 Battalion, which attacked and almost 
over-ran one of the Australian companies, “hugging" to avoid the artillery 
fire. The VC unit engaged the Australian company for over an hour 
despite the heavy artillery barrage brought down amongst them. VC 
losses for the action were six killed by body count, while the Australians 
lost two dead and 12 wounded. Several other small clashes occurred
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during the five day operation and the final casualties were nine VC by 
body count, with Australian casualties at three dead and 19 wounded.
The other major action occurred in August when a company 
patrol o f Sixth Battalion walked into a major VC ambush in a rubber 
plantation near the deserted village ofLongTan, only 2,500 metres (less 
than two miles) from the Task Force base. Nui Dat base had been 
mortared in the early hours o f 17 August and B Company, Sixth 
Battalion, had been sent out at first light to investigate. D Company was 
sent to relieve them on the following day. On meeting and relieving B 
company. D company moved into the Long Tan rubber plantation and 30 
minutes later, as they moved toward the eastern side o f the plantation, 
the ambush was initiated. One Australian platoon (30 men) was cut off, 
but the ensuing constant movement of the rest o f the company over a 
wide area o f the plantation while trying to relieve this platoon proved one 
of the factors that saved the Australians. Others may have been the 
weather and sustained supporting fire; visibility was cut to 100 metres 
by fierce rain storms and artillery pounded into the enemy positions. D 
company was finally relieved after a tense four hour battle, when an 
Australian relief force of APC mounted infantry firing heavy machine 
guns moved into the plantation in the dark.
An official body count o f 245 VC has been recorded, but Socialist 
Republic o f Vietnam authorities refute this count and say around 150 
were killed, and those mainly due to artillery.25 The Australian losses 
were 18 killed and 26 wounded. Vietnamese sources say that the action 
was initiated both to stop the Australian policy of destruction in the 
province and to show support for the people of the displaced villages of 
Long Phuoc and Long Tan.26
The battle brought home to the Australians that the war was 
more than a counter-insurgency conflict. Major re-organization was 
initiated, from senior command down to re-assessing the ammunition 
“states" for infantry riflemen. Ammunition “states” had previously been 
60 rounds of rifle ammunition per rifleman and 200 rounds per machine 
gun, inadequate levels of supply in circumstances such as the extensive 
contact at Long Tan; this fact alone gives an indication o f the Australian 
knowledge and perception of the situation in Vietnam. The major impact 
of Long Tan was the realization that battalion operations would, from 
then on, have to function in tighter formations, meaning that operations 
o f battalion size would cover even smaller areas than previously and 
cou Id moreover never move ou tside art illery range. Comma nd of APC s was 
given “unequivocally” to the infantiy commander and a “ready reaction 
company” was always to be on hand in the Task Force area, tying u p even 
more troops in static situations. For the rest of the year the Australians 
continued to work slowly outwards from the base at Nui Dat, but did not 
make contact with other than small local force units.
The year 1966 ended with the Australians committing themselves 
to the development of a larger base camp which required a greater 
number o f troops to man, so cutting down on operational efficiency. Not
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surprisingly the operations undertaken by the Australians following this 
expansionary move were not of the kind Westmoreland had envisaged; 
Australians were not confronting main force units in their base areas 
and sanctuaries, but conducting pacification operations within their 
own Tactical Area o f Responsibilty (TAOR). In February 1967 
Westmoreland visited the Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy and 
confronted the Australian commanders about what he considered the 
poor results achieved by the force:
I then departed for the Australian Task Force where I called on 
Brigadier Graham, the new commander, for the first time. The 
Australians are very inactive and I learned they are about to 
rotate their two battalions which means they will be virtually 
ineffective for over a month. Out of a 4,600 man force they are 
able to put only six companies into the field. They have a large 
base to defend which requires two companies [at least]. I 
expressed to Brigadier Graham my disappointment and 
subsequently in talking to the Australian Ambassador, to General 
Mackay upon his departure, and to General Vincent upon his 
arrival, I expressed my concern that very little combat power was 
being generated by the 4,600 man force. Furthermore, I suggested 
that they might want to change their unit rotation policy which 
I thought would allow them to increase their combat power with 
the same total number of troops and at the same time have them 
in a fighting posture for twelve months. The Australians were a 
little shocked at my comments but I explained in all fairness to 
the command and to their reputation, this observation should be 
known.27
Several months later this difference in interpretation of role between the 
American and Australian commands was noted again.
Military operations are not evaluated though it should be noted 
that the Australians have been extremely effective in securing an 
area through intensive day and night operations within their 
TAOR [Tactical Area Of Responsibility] . . . However, the primary 
mission of the Australian Force is to carry out offensive operations 
against the enemy, rather than engage in territorial pacification 
missions.28
Despite these criticisms from the senior command of which they 
were a part, the Australians remained within the confines of Phuoc Tuy 
until January 1968. There were only two major actions in 1967, and 
again these were enemy initiated.
Conclusions
When Australia committed forces to South Vietnam in 1962 the 
military aim was motivated by the self-interested political hope of 
securing a United States presence in southeast Asia. During the period 
of the involvement the rationale remained the same. South Vietnam and
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its people were only important to Australia as appendages o f the United 
States. Policy decisions o f the Australian Army were tied more to national 
political need than overall strategic thought and were ad hoc in nature. 
The Australians had to make decisions in haste in order to keep pace 
with the rapid American escalation. The true nature of the war could not 
be addressed because this was contrary to the supposed rationale for 
being involved. Australian soldiers and the public were told that the 
people o f South Vietnam wanted to be protected from the forces o f the 
revolutionary movement; this in fact was far from the case. Many families 
in the south had members fighting with, or supporting, the Viet Cong, 
especially in the countryside where there was little loyalty to the 
government in Saigon. Therefore the policy decisions which reflected the 
belief that the people wanted and appreciated the allied presence were 
doomed to failure because in practice they were not based upon a 
realistic analysis o f the situation.
The decisions taken on the location and size of the base at Nui Dat 
are examples o f this faulty analysis. The Nui Dal base locked the 
Australian force into a position from which it was impossible to move in 
the following years o f involvement. The support o f a large proportion of 
the province’s population was lost in 1966 and was never won back. The 
forced m ovement of 8000 people and the destruction o f their homes and 
livelihoods without any attempt at compensation by the Australians or 
the Government of South Vietnam permanently alienated a large 
proportion o f the province population. The support o f the people for their 
own government and its allies was essential if the conflict was ever to 
achieve the conclusion desired by that government, the United States 
and Australia alike, yet the first actions of the Australians in Phuoc Tuy 
had the opposite effect. Later actions, such as the dumping of bodies in 
the market squares, the prohibitions on land use and the arresting and 
handing over to the South Vietnamese of ARVN draft dodgers, increased 
the animosity toward the Australian presence.
The size and complexity o f the base and the waste of manpower 
its defence entailed were givens that later Task Force commanders had 
no option but to accept. The base restricted the mobility o f combat forces 
and the overall combat ability o f the Australian effort by tying up men 
and equipment in static defence roles. The cost o f the Australian effort 
could have been cut in half and better results achieved in line with 
COM USM ACVs policies by placing the battalions and supporting arms 
in the base complex o f the Logistic Support Base at Vung Tau. The 
battalions would then have been free to move on operat ions into any part 
o f the eastern section o f III Corps without having to be concerned for the 
security o f an exposed rear area. They would have been able to fit more 
easily into General Westmoreland’s concept of “manoeuvre battalions” 
and perhaps have played a distinctive role in II Field Force combat 
operations that were mounting in intensity during 1966.
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